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INTRODUCTION
1

A mother killing her child is a shocking event. In the United
States, our child protection system seeks to prevent this type of
horror, along with countless other acts that harm children. Despite
having a system designed to protect children from harm, hundreds
2
of children are killed by their mothers each year. Each death
represents a failure of our systems and communities, and
individuals within both, to protect children. The typical response to
filicide tends to focus on the actions of the individual mother
rather than the failures of the system. Our current criminal justice
system often deals with these cases and mothers harshly, not taking
into account the unique, gendered circumstances that lead a
mother to this desperate act. Society is quick to place blame on the
archetype of a selfish, unfeeling mother who kills a child because
3
she feels inconvenienced by motherhood. Neonaticide, a
subcategory of filicide, is particularly fraught with extremely
negative life circumstances, including mental illness, substance
4
abuse, and trauma. These circumstances, in many cases, could be
recognized and remedied with the right intervention. We believe
that holistic, feminist legal representation could achieve this
intervention in some cases, possibly preventing the extreme, tragic
outcome of the death of a child.
Feminist legal theories originated out of a desire to promote
“equality” within our traditional legal systems by penalizing sex
discrimination. However, “equality” is a relative term, and feminist
scholarship has been justifiably critiqued for its narrow and
privileged view of women’s issues. Sex discrimination litigation, for
example, offers very little help to women who are trapped,
traumatized, and isolated—factors that can lead to the death of a

1. MARGARET G. SPINELLI, INFANTICIDE: PSYCHOSOCIAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES ON MOTHERS WHO KILL, at xv (1st ed. 2003) (describing maternal
infanticide as a subject “both compelling and repulsive”).
2. Natalie K. Isser & Lita Linzer Schwartz, Engendered Homicide, 36 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L. 577, 585–86 (2008).
3. See generally Jayne Huckerby, Women Who Kill Their Children: Case Study and
Conclusions Concerning the Differences in the Fall from Maternal Grace by Khoua Her and
Andrea Yates, 10 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 149 (2003) (exploring “the roles of
race and culture, class, marital status, and biology in the media’s treatment of two
infanticidal women”).
4. Steven E. Pitt & Erin M. Bale, Neonaticide, Infanticide, and Filicide: A Review
of the Literature, 23 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 375, 375–76 (1995).
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child at the hands of a mother. Some feminist theories provide
contextual and biological frameworks for understanding mothers
who kill through a gendered lens. Within these cultural theories of
difference, however, mental health, domestic violence, and poverty
are not adequately addressed at either the charging or sentencing
stages when mothers are charged with killing their children. In the
particular instance of neonaticide (committed almost exclusively by
women), a feminist inquiry must include consideration of domestic
violence, poverty, and trauma. Context is critically important in
considering the causes of infanticide: “The crime . . . is committed
by mothers who cannot parent their child under the circumstances
5
dictated by their unique position in place and time.”
More importantly, the trauma that women experience prior to
killing their children has usually been ongoing for years without
appropriate intervention from attorneys or the child protection
system. Why do these women end up in a situation where they
make the fateful choice to kill or abandon their children? Are these
deaths preventable? Are these women “bad mothers”? What role
should lawyers play in attempting to prevent these deaths?
In this paper, we attempt to answer these questions by
considering the unique vantage point of Native women and
6
mothers. We decided to focus on Native women and their children
for three reasons. First, the perspectives and stories of Native
women have historically been invisible from analytical critiques of
the child protection system. We consider the experiences of Native
women for their intrinsic value and truth. Their stories have not
been sufficiently told. Second, some of today’s Native children and
their families experience harmful indicators for child poverty, child
abuse, and child health in the United States. Third, the child
protection system removes children from Native homes at rates
7
much higher than other groups. Thus, an exploration of the
experiences of Native women allows a magnification of the

5. CHERYL L. MEYER & MICHELLE OBERMAN, MOTHERS WHO KILL THEIR
CHILDREN: UNDERSTANDING THE ACTS OF MOMS FROM SUSAN SMITH TO THE “PROM
MOM” 2 (2001) (emphasis added).
6. For the purposes of this article, we use “Native” and “tribal”
interchangeably to refer to indigenous people from the United States—also
known as American Indian or Native American. In Canada, the Native population
is also labeled “First Nation” or “Aboriginal.” We rely on some Canadian sources
because of parallel socio-legal history.
7. See infra Part II.B.3.
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weaknesses and failures of the American legal system, particularly
8
how oppression and discrimination shape individual experiences.
What we learn from the perspective of a Native mother can
illustrate the methodology we should use to identify weaknesses
and failures of the contemporary legal system. In addition,
considering the distinct experiences of Native women requires us
to take a hard look at the racist origins of the American child
protection system, and how that racism and oppression continues
to play a role in today’s current system.
One avenue for critiquing current interventions for Native
families comes from feminist legal theory, particularly when
considering the gendered aspects of child protection. Feminist
scholars have established methodology and practice principles that
have seen improvements in the lives of women. However, we
believe that feminist legal theory has not done enough to fully
account for the factors that can lead women to desperate acts like
neonaticide. Feminist legal theory has also not focused enough on
the importance of representing women who have harmed or killed
their children. Moreover, there is very little literature that considers
how feminist legal theory intersects with the lives of Native women.
Thus, this article offers another intervention that considers the role
of feminist theory as applied to the lives of Native women and
children. This article is ultimately designed to consider the
advantages and disadvantages of applying feminist legal theory and
9
practice to the lives of Native mothers in crisis. We begin in Part II
by exploring the complex and tragic history of child protection and
Native women, providing historical context for our analysis. In
Part III, we consider the story of Dana Deegan, a Native woman
who was convicted for the death of her newborn son on the Fort
Berthold Indian Reservation in 2008. Ms. Deegan’s story is a tragic
account of a Native mother in crisis. It also provides an explicit
example of how the child protection and legal systems failed to

8. Adrien Katherine Wing explains, “[E]xisting legal paradigms under U.S.,
foreign, and international law have permitted women of color to fall through the
cracks—becoming literally and figuratively voiceless and invisible.” GLOBAL
CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: AN INTERNATIONAL READER 2 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed.,
2000).
9. By “mothers in crisis,” we mean to include a variety of scenarios in which
a mother may be unable to protect her children from harm and/or removal. Such
scenarios include poverty, mental illness, trauma, isolation, and violence. See infra
Part II for more descriptions.
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provide protection and justice for a Native woman. In Part IV, we
offer an analysis of potential legal responses to Native women in
crisis, using feminist lawyering practices and holistic legal services.
We conclude by examining and critiquing existing feminist theory
as applied to Native mothers, and we offer potential frameworks
that can address our perceived weaknesses with a traditional
feminist theoretical approach.
II. BACKGROUND: NATIVE AMERICAN EXPERIENCES WITH CHILD
PROTECTIVE SERVICES
In this section, we explore the intersection of the child
protection system and the lives of Native women and their children
in the United States. In short, traditional American child protective
services (CPS) have historically been the cause of great harm to
Native women and their families. Historical trauma, which
emanates from the forced application of patriarchal colonial
systems, has resulted in a system in which Native women are often
10
trapped in desperate circumstances.
Risk factors for mothers and children (domestic violence,
addiction, poverty, and isolation) are significantly elevated in tribal
communities. Before we can consider how feminist interventions
may offer solutions for protecting Native women and their families,
it is important to understand the historical and contemporary
context for Native mothers in crisis. We begin with a historical
perspective, considering traditional tribal conceptions of
mothering and parenthood. We then consider how colonizing laws
and policies of the United States and its predecessors have
weakened traditional tribal systems of kinship and protection.
A.

Precolonial Native Motherhood

Understanding the roots of Native motherhood requires a
consideration of traditional gender roles. One of the biggest
challenges in writing about Native women is the tendency to overgeneralize and over-romanticize precolonial gender roles. It would
be a mistake to say that all tribal nations in North America were

10. See Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, The Big Pipe Case, in WHY I CAN’T READ WALLACE
STEGNER AND OTHER ESSAYS: A TRIBAL VOICE 110, 110–11 (1996) (telling the story
of a Native teenager who was charged with a felony for breastfeeding her daughter
under the influence of alcohol).
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11

strictly matriarchal, matrilineal, or egalitarian. However, when
compared with typical European gendered relations, it can be
argued that most Native women generally exercised more power
than their European counterparts, including political and spiritual
12
authority. Moreover, many Native cultures traditionally honored
the role of Native women in making their own decisions about
13
marriage, sexual partners, and pregnancy. Pregnant women had
access to community support, including medicinal interventions for
14
health challenges. Generally, pregnancy and childbirth were
15
considered to be normal, natural life events.
The legal status of children is also an important cultural
component that is under-addressed. Children establish the
foundation of a tribal community. In Lakota, for example, the word
16
for children translates into “sacred being.” Martin Brokenleg
explains:
If one were to say “You are acting like a child” in any
European language, this would be interpreted as an
insult. In my Lakota tongue, this phrase would be “You

11. See, e.g., Emma LaRocque, The Colonization of a Native Woman Scholar, in
WOMEN OF THE FIRST NATIONS: POWER, WISDOM, AND STRENGTH 11, 14 (Christine
Miller & Patricia Chuchryk eds., 1996) (“[W]e cannot assume that all Aboriginal
traditions universally respected and honoured women.”).
12. See, e.g., Carrie A. Martell & Sarah Deer, Heeding the Voice of Native Women:
Toward an Ethic of Decolonization, 81 N.D. L. REV. 807, 814 (2005) (finding that
women in egalitarian societies had more control over their relationships); Andrea
Smith, Native American Feminism, Sovereignty and Social Change, in MAKING SPACE FOR
INDIGENOUS FEMINISM 93, 102 (Joyce Green ed., 2007) (providing that Native
women served as “spiritual, political, and military leaders”); Katherine M. Weist,
Beasts of Burden and Menial Slaves: Nineteenth Century Observations of Northern Plains
Indian Women, in THE HIDDEN HALF: STUDIES OF PLAINS INDIAN WOMEN 29, 41–45
(Patricia Albers & Beatrice Medicine eds., 1983) (summarizing and comparing the
amount of economic control women of different tribes had).
13. See, e.g., Mona Etienne & Eleanor Leacock, Introduction to WOMEN AND
COLONIZATION: ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1, 13 (Mona Etienne & Eleanor
Leacock eds., 1980).
14. See CAROLYN NIETHAMMER, DAUGHTERS OF THE EARTH: THE LIVES AND
LEGENDS OF AMERICAN INDIAN WOMEN 1–6 (1977) (outlining the various
community support).
15. Claudia R. Long & Mary Ann Curry, Living in Two Worlds: Native American
Women and Prenatal Care, 19 HEALTH CARE WOMEN INT. 205, 206 (1998).
16. Martin Brokenleg, Native Wisdom on Belonging, in 7 RECLAIMING CHILDREN
& YOUTH 130, 130 (1998).
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are acting like a sacred being,” which is certainly not a
17
put-down.
In terms of motherhood, there is evidence to conclude that
Native women have always had highly valued relationships with
their children, while the nuclear family values of twentieth century
white America were most certainly absent. Native cultures typically
have very complicated, intricate systems of kinship. The AngloAmerican distinction between “immediate” and “extended” family
18
simply did not exist. Biological and marital relationships have
traditionally been interwoven throughout the community, such
that any particular tribal citizen has literally hundreds of
19
“immediate” family members. Traditionally, children in tribal
communities often had multiple “mothers,” given that a child’s
aunts and other female relatives would also carry the term
20
“mother.” In addition, biological parents were not always the
primary caregivers or teachers of their children. In some cultures,
first-time parents would relinquish the day-to-day rearing of their
first child to grandparents. Only after observation of parenting
skills from this vantage point would biological parents be equipped
with the skills needed to properly care for a child. In some cultures,
21
primary discipline for children was delegated to aunts or uncles.
Responsibility for raising children belonged to the larger
22
community. There was no need for a “child welfare system”
17. Id.
18. In 1883 Sarah Winnemucca Hopkins, a Paiute woman, explained, “Our
tenth cousin is as near to us as our first cousin.” SARAH WINNEMUCCA HOPKINS, LIFE
AMONG THE PIUTES: THEIR WRONGS AND CLAIMS 45 (1883).
19. MARK ST. PIERRE & TILDA LONG SOLDIER, WALKING IN THE SACRED
MANNER 64–65 (1995).
20. See Brokenleg, supra note 16, at 130; Charles Horejsi et al., Reactions by
Native American Parents to Child Protection Agencies: Cultural and Community Factors,
71 CHILD WELFARE 329, 338 (1992).
21. Of Plains Indian culture, St. Pierre and Long Soldier write, “It was
generally accepted that the mother’s sisters would discipline and teach their
sisters’ children; their mother’s brothers performed the same role for boys.”
ST. PIERRE & LONG SOLDIER, supra note 19, at 63. Lakota elder Lucy Swan
articulated the wisdom of this practice: “[P]arents sometimes are short with their
own children. The aunts and uncles could teach the children without getting
upset, and that left the relationship with their mother and father a good and
loving one.” Id.
22. Sarah Winnemucca Hopkins (Paiute) wrote, “The young [Paiute]
mothers often get together and exchange their experiences about the attentions
of their husbands; and inquire of each other if the fathers did their duty to the
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because the kinship relationships of a child would ensure that
there would be supervision, care, and nurture from members of the
23
child’s extended family. If a parent were unable to provide care,
another relative would assume this role immediately and
24
transparently. These systems of kinship and responsibilities
negated the need for any unrelated third-party intervention into
the life of a child.
B.

Colonization and Native Mothers
25

Colonial encounter has threatened Native motherhood in at
least three different ways as explored below. Ultimately, the
imposition of Euro-American parenting standards was the
foundation for the erosion of traditional parenting structures in
many tribal communities. Isolation and shame have replaced the
cultural parenting norms, which included extensive kinship
networks and child-rearing responsibilities. Native families have
been targets of social workers for over a century—and, by
extension, the child protection system—and the results have been
devastating.
1.

Missionary Belief Systems About the Cultural Inferiority of Native
Women’s Mothering Skills

European and American missionaries historically approached
26
Native people and cultures as primitive—even subhuman. In
particular, the positive parenting practices that served as the
foundation for Native kinship systems were often deemed to be
inadequate, irrational, and even immoral in the eyes of foreign
officials. Conversion to Christianity was often accompanied by an
children, and were careful of their wives’ health.” HOPKINS, supra note 18, at 50; see
also WALTER LITTLEMOON, THEY CALLED ME UNCIVILIZED: THE MEMOIR OF AN
EVERYDAY LAKOTA MAN FROM WOUNDED KNEE 4 (“[T]he whole tribe protected
[children] . . . . Everyone watched over them.”).
23. Horejsi et al., supra note 20, at 335.
24. See ST. PIERRE & LONG SOLDIER, supra note 19, at 65.
25. By “motherhood” we refer to the constellation of cultural norms and
practices that governs the relationship between women and children. These
relationships include legal, moral, spiritual, and practical obligations.
26. See, e.g., Myra Rutherdale, Revisiting Colonization Through Gender: Anglican
Missionary Women in the Pacific Northwest and the Arctic, 1860–1945, 104 BRIT.
COLUMBIAN STUD. Q. 3, 5 (1994) (explaining that in a missionary’s eyes, “natives
were often reduced to the status of animals”).
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expectation that Native people would raise their children as the
27
Europeans did. This created a significant “culture clash” as the
two approaches to parenting were often incompatible.
Many Native cultures, for example, forbade the use of corporal
punishment as a method for disciplining children. However, failure
to use physical punishment against children did not sit well with
many missionaries. French Jesuit missionary Paul Le Juene wrote of
the Huron people, “These Barbarians cannot bear to have their
children punished, nor even scolded, not being able to refuse
28
anything to a crying child.” Another missionary wrote, “The
Savages love their children above all things. They are like the
29
Monkeys—they choke them by embracing them too closely.”
Thus, many missionaries challenged not only parenting practices,
but also parenting philosophies. For centuries, Christian leaders
encouraged the adoption of Euro-Christian child-rearing practices,
which were modeled on the “nuclear” family (e.g., one husband
who works outside the home, one woman who stays inside the
home and provides child care). Moreover, these practices were also
predicated on female subservience, introducing a form of
institutionalized sexism that had no predecessor in many tribal
30
cultures. Slowly, the “governance of matrilineality began to fade
31
amongst many families.” As the power of Native women
decreased, the external threats to Native motherhood increased.
2.

Native Mothers and the Early American Child Protection System

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, liberal social
reformers used privilege and class to reinforce their belief that
32
Native children would be better off without their mothers. These
27. See, e.g., KAREN ANDERSON, CHAIN HER BY ONE FOOT: THE
SUBJUGATION OF NATIVE WOMEN IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY NEW FRANCE 21 (1991)
(“Christianization . . . implied that everyone be brought under the same rules of
conduct.”).
28. Id. at 160.
29. CAROL DEVENS, COUNTERING COLONIZATION: NATIVE AMERICAN WOMEN
AND GREAT LAKES MISSIONS, 1630–1900, at 12 (1992).
30. See, e.g., WILMA MANKILLER & MICHAEL WALLIS, MANKILLER: A CHIEF AND
HER PEOPLE 20 (1993) (“Sexism was borrowed from Europeans.”).
31. Denise K. Henning, Yes, My Daughters, We Are Cherokee Women, in MAKING
SPACE FOR INDIGENOUS FEMINISM, supra note 12, at 194.
32. See Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act:
Toward a New Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 602–04
(2002); Lorie M. Graham, “The Past Never Vanishes”: A Contextual Critique of the
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reformers usually characterized Native women as “unfit mothers
whose children had to be removed from their homes and
communities to be raised properly by white women within
33
institutions.” The efforts of wealthy white women to reinforce
what they perceived to be appropriate femininity necessarily placed
traditional Native motherhood as inferior to that of Euro-American
standards. As historian Margaret Jacobs notes, white motherhood
34
was “sacred,” while indigenous motherhood was “pathological.”
Throughout the United States, Native children were removed
from tribal nations by force, fraud, or deceit to be sent to
35
government and church-run boarding schools. Some children
were shipped thousands of miles from their home. The separation
of Native women from their children was marked by violence and
36
37
despair. In some cases, children were kidnapped. On some
reservations, parents who refused to cooperate with child removal

Existing Indian Family Doctrine, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 2, 25–27 (1998); Ann
Murray Haag, The Indian Boarding School Era and Its Continuing Impact on Tribal
Families and the Provision of Government Services, 43 TULSA L. REV. 149, 151–54
(2007); Patrice H. Kunesh, Transcending Frontiers: Indian Child Welfare in the United
States, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 17, 22–24 (1996); Ryan Seelau, Regaining Control
over the Children: Reversing the Legacy of Assimilative Policies in Education, Child Welfare,
and Juvenile Justice That Targeted Native American Youth, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 63,
82–88 (2013).
33. Margaret D. Jacobs, The Great White Mother: Maternalism and American
Indian Child Removal in the American West, 1880–1940, in ONE STEP OVER THE LINE:
TOWARD A HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE NORTH AMERICAN WESTS 191, 192 (Elizabeth
Jameson & Sheila McManus eds., 2008).
34. MARGARET D. JACOBS, WHITE MOTHER TO A DARK RACE: SETTLER
COLONIALISM, MATERNALISM, AND THE REMOVAL OF INDIGENOUS CHILDREN IN THE
AMERICAN WEST AND AUSTRALIA, 1880–1940, at 131 (2009).
35. A good description of this era comes from Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 7 Cl. Ct. 468, 478 (1985). See Marc Mannes, Factors and Events Leading to the
Passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 74 CHILD WELFARE 264, 266 (1995).
36. In 1892 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Thomas J. Morgan, issued a
rule providing that Indians who attempted to “prevent the attendance of children
at school” were guilty of an offense and subject to imprisonment “for not less than
ten days.” A subsequent offense could be punished by as much as six months
incarceration. H.R. Doc. No. 52-1, at 28–31 (1892); see also AMERICANIZING THE
AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE “FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN,” 1880–1900, at 302
(Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973) (quoting Thomas J. Morgan’s regulations
regarding rules for Indian courts).
37. See BRENDA J. CHILD, BOARDING SCHOOL SEASONS: AMERICAN INDIAN
FAMILIES 1900–1940, at 13 (2000).
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38

were threatened with starvation. Native families resorted to
desperate measures to protect their children. Historical records
include documentation of Native women in the Southwest burying
their children in the dirt or placing them in bushes to hide them
39
from government agents. The resistance was for good reason. At
most of the boarding schools, Native children were stripped of
40
cultural and spiritual identity. Although a variety of different
boarding school models existed, ranging from more benign
reservation-based day schools to military-style institutions thousands
41
of miles from home, the goal was the same: forced assimilation.
Native children were essentially taught that their identity and
culture were shameful and, by extension, their families and parents
42
were also shameful. In most of these schools, children were not
allowed to speak their language or practice their spiritual
43
traditions. The stated goal of this era was to “civilize” Native
44
people. From the vantage point of the colonial system, civilization
was only possible if Native children denied their identity and
45
heritage. Another sinister aspect to the boarding school era was
38. See Act approved Mar. 3, 1893, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 612, 635 (“[T]he
Secretary of the Interior may in his discretion withhold rations . . . from Indian
parents or guardians who refuse or neglect to send and keep their children of
proper school age in some school . . . .”); Act approved Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543,
26 Stat. 989, 1014 (“[T]he Commissioner of Indian Affairs . . . is hereby authorized
and directed to make and enforce by proper means such rules and regulations as
will secure the attendance of Indian children . . . at schools . . . .”); JACOBS, supra
note 34, at 159.
39. JACOBS, supra note 34, at 156–57.
40. KAREN SWIFT, MANUFACTURING “BAD MOTHERS”: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE
ON CHILD NEGLECT 129 (1995).
41. See generally Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the
Seventh Generation, reprinted in FACING THE FUTURE: THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
AT 30, at 50, 51 (Matthew L.M. Fletcher et al. eds., 2009) (showing that the
government embraced policies of forced assimilation).
42. See, e.g., Karen Saylors & Nalini Daliparthy, Aiming to Balance: Native
Women Healing in an Urban Behavioral Health Care Clinic, in HEALING AND MENTAL
HEALTH FOR NATIVE AMERICANS 169, 172 (Ethan Nebelkopf & Mary Phillips eds.,
2004).
43. SWIFT, supra note 40, at 129.
44. ZIIBIWING CTR. OF ANISHINABE CULTURE & LIFEWAYS, AMERICAN INDIAN
BOARDING SCHOOLS 4–5 (2011); see also Barbara Perry, From Ethnocide to
Ethnoviolence: Layers of Native American Victimization, 5 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 231,
235–36 (2002) (discussing the ethnocide of Native people).
45. ZIIBIWING CTR. OF ANISHINABE CULTURE & LIFEWAYS, supra note 44, at 4–5;
see also Graham, supra note 41, at 51.
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the widespread sexual abuse that occurred in many facilities. This
painful aspect of the boarding school era has only recently received
47
widespread attention.
At least two aspects of the boarding school era are relevant to
this discussion on Native motherhood. First, it was both a racist and
anti-sovereignty project. At its core, removing children from their
homes on a mass scale reinforced racist beliefs about the capacity
of Native people to be good parents and served to break up tribal
kinship networks that formed the basis for self-government.
Second, the boarding school era disrupted the normal transmission
of parenting values and skills by denying Native children the
opportunity to experience these practices for themselves. Corporal
punishment, once abhorred in Native communities, was regularly
48
instituted at most boarding schools. Many survivors of the
boarding school era have expressed how difficult it was for them to
be good parents themselves, because they had been raised in nonNative institutions that repeatedly punished them for being
49
Indian.
From the children’s perspective, the boarding school era also
50
introduced systemic internalized oppression about mothering.
Native children no longer had access to the parenting styles of their
51
culture. Instead, they learned systemic military-style organization
52
and corporal discipline.

46. See, e.g., SWIFT, supra note 40, at 129.
47. Stephanie Woodard, South Dakota Boarding School Survivors Detail Sexual
Abuse, INDIAN COUNTRY (July 28, 2011), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork
.com/2011/07/28/south-dakota-boarding-school-survivors-detail-sexual-abuse
-42420.
48. DAVID WALLACE ADAMS, EDUCATION FOR EXTINCTION: AMERICAN INDIANS
AND THE BOARDING SCHOOL EXPERIENCE, 1875–1928, at 121 (1995).
49. Patrick J. Morrissette, The Holocaust of First Nation People: Residual Effects on
Parenting and Treatment Implications, 16 CONTEMP. FAM. THERAPY 381, 381 (1994).
50. ZIIBIWING CTR. OF ANISHINABE CULTURE & LIFEWAYS, supra note 44, at 10.
51. ST. PIERRE & LONG SOLDIER, supra note 19, at 203 (“This educational
system systematically destroyed Indian parenting patterns, slowly squeezing the life
out of the traditional Indian attitude toward extended family.”).
52. Horejsi et al., supra note 20, at 329. In one study, for example, many
Native women who attended boarding schools later had less confidence about
their abilities to mother. Ann Metcalf, From Schoolgirl to Mother: The Effects of
Education on Navajo Women, 23 SOC. PROBS. 535, 535 (1976) (documenting anxiety
and lack of confidence in a group of Navajo mothers who were separated from
their families as children).
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More recently, the long-lasting, psychological harm that has
developed in response to the family-destroying policies and
practices of the federal government has been characterized as
53
“historical trauma.” Historical trauma permeates many of the
physical and psychological challenges faced by Native people,
including pregnancy and parenting. Conceptualizing historical
trauma has been helpful for the field of social work and
psychology; later in this article, we consider particularly how
54
historical trauma can inform feminist legal theory.
3.

Twentieth Century Child Protection System

The systemic interference between Native children and their
parents continued unabated in the twentieth century. When
attendance at boarding school was no longer compulsory, Native
families became the targets of another growing movement—the
child protection system. Social workers became the new saviors of
Native children and interfered with families for the “crimes” of
poverty and isolation. Child welfare workers often explicitly argued
that Native babies and children would be better off if they were
55
living with non-Native, affluent families. The Child Welfare
League, for example, established an official Indian Adoption
56
Project that lasted from 1959 to 1967. Lakota Woman author Mary
Crow Dog explained that in the 1950s and 1960s “[a] flush toilet to
a white social worker [was] more important than a good
57
grandmother.” Child welfare workers classified kinship practices,
58
such as sibling care, as “neglect.”
53. Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart, The Historical Trauma Response Among
Natives and Its Relationship to Substance Abuse, in HEALING AND MENTAL HEALTH FOR
NATIVE AMERICANS, supra note 42, at 7.
54. See infra Part IV. One significant drawback of using a historical trauma
framework is that it often dominates stereotypes showing Native people as broken
rather than celebrating the strength and resiliency of Native people. See, e.g., Eve
Tuck, Suspending Damage: A Letter to Communities, 79 HARV. EDUC. REV. 409, 413
(2009) (“[T]he danger in damage-centered research is that it is a pathologizing
approach in which the oppression singularly defines a community.”).
55. See, e.g., SWIFT, supra note 40, at 131–32.
56. Claire Palmiste, From the Indian Adoption Project to the Indian Child Welfare
Act: The Resistance of Native American Communities, 22 INDIGENOUS POL’Y J. 1, 1
(2011).
57. MARY CROW DOG & RICHARD ERDOES, LAKOTA WOMAN 16 (1st ed. 1990).
58. See, e.g., Gertrude Buckanaga, I Always Felt Truly Indian, in I AM THE FIRE
OF TIME 94, 94 (Jane B. Katz ed., 1977) (“Today, if a child is left alone with older
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Attacks on Native families came from many disciplines,
including health care. One example emerges from a health care
campaign to address high rates of infant mortality on reservations
in the early 1900s, called “Save the Babies.” The national program
was intended to teach Native mothers proper sanitation and health
59
care for newborns. Unfortunately, this campaign also came at a
price—practitioners often operated with a racist assumption that
Native women were ignorant about infant care and that Native ways
of caring for children were inferior to those of the Euro-American
60
culture. In reality, the cause of high infant mortality rates in tribal
communities was more likely related to poverty, malnutrition, and
61
oppression. But because of the disrespectful nature of such
programs, Native mothers were often inclined to avoid these health
care practitioners and social workers.
The very philosophical approach of Western social work
created a climate in which the ability of the government power to
break up the Native family was self-executing:
Child protection workers are directed to identify and
design treatment for the problematic behaviours of
individual caregivers, not to document and develop
responses to problems of poverty, racism, and violence,
and the way these affect women’s lives. Not surprisingly,
then, child protection discourse tends to blame individual
62
mothers for child neglect.
The wholesale removal of Native children—almost always on
account of “neglect”—from their communities reached such a high
level in the late twentieth century that it took an act of Congress to
intervene. According to a 1969 study, data showed that, nationally,
between twenty-five and thirty-five percent of Native children had

children, the Welfare will come in and say that the child is neglected. But within
Indian families, it was accepted that the older children would care for the younger
ones.”).
59. Gregory R. Campbell, The Political Epidemiology of Infant Mortality: A Health
Crisis Among Montana American Indians, 13 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 105, 108
(1989); see also Patricia Jasen, Race, Culture, and the Colonization of Childbirth in
Northern Canada, 10 SOC’Y. FOR HIST. MED. 383, 395–96 (1997) (discussing a
governmental survey of infant mortality based on the assumption that more
contact with governmental health services would improve rates).
60. Campbell, supra note 59, at 107–08.
61. Id.
62. Marlee Kline, Complicating the Ideology of Motherhood: Child Welfare Law and
First Nation Women, 18 QUEEN’S L.J. 306, 320 (1993).
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63

been separated from their families. Extreme examples included
rates of adoptive placements for Native children that were nineteen
64
times that of non-Native children in Washington State. In that
same time frame, foster care placements for Native children in
South Dakota were approximately sixteen times greater than the
65
rate for non-Native children.
When Congress passed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
in 1978, it signaled an acknowledgment that the American legal
system had been used as a tool to destroy Native families and was
intended to enhance the likelihood that Native families could stay
66
together. However, even after thirty-five years of ICWA, Native
children are still removed from their homes at rates far exceeding
67
that of other groups. Native women have heard of these sad tales
for at least three generations—from their mothers, grandmothers,
aunts, and sisters.
C.

The Legacy of Child Removal and Native Mothers

Today’s Native pregnant women and mothers wrestle with this
dark legacy of child removal when assessing their options for help
in times of crisis. For good reason, there is a great deal of distrust
68
of outside intervention. “Native parents may behave in ways that
cause practitioners to view them as ‘uncooperative,’ ‘unmotivated,’
69
‘resistant,’ or ‘hard-to-reach.’” In many tribal communities,
disclosing domestic violence or child abuse is considered to be a

63. Mannes, supra note 35, at 267.
64. Id. at 267–68.
65. Carl Mindell & Alan Gurwitt, The Placement of American Indian Children—
the Need for Change, in THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN INDIAN FAMILIES 61, 62
(Steven Unger ed., 1977); see also SWIFT, supra note 40, at 45 (explaining that, in
Canada, this era can be considered the “sixties scoop”).
66. See Indian Child Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 95-608, §§ 2–3, 92 Stat. 3069
(1978) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1902 (2012)).
67. See generally NAT’L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N & THE PEW CHARITABLE
TRUSTS, TIME FOR REFORM: A MATTER OF JUSTICE FOR AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKAN
NATIVE CHILDREN (2007), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles
/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Foster_care_reform/NICWAReport.pdf (stating that
Native children are disproportionately represented in state foster care systems).
68. See generally Horejsi et al., supra note 20, at 329 (describing the societal
and historical influences that impact a Native’s way of thinking about outside
intervention).
69. Id. at 329–30. In context, these distrustful behaviors can actually be seen
as proactive coping strategies to deal with a destructive system.
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sign of inexcusable betrayal—because alerting authorities to any
potential harm within the home can open the door to child
70
removal. Given the trauma of mass child removal in tribal
communities, it has been safer to try to resolve the problem
internally rather than seek help from third parties. Outside agency
intervention from state and federal agencies may not be overtly
racist today, but there continue to be vestiges of superiority and
disrespect for Native cultures. Even today, standard social work
curriculum does not explain the historical context in which Native
71
people parent. Duran and Duran note bluntly that “[m]ost of the
attempts at providing services to Native American people have
72
ended in failure.”
Simultaneously, due to the breakdown of extended kinship
networks and systems of care, the once-strong internal tribal
structures themselves might not be able to take on these issues and
73
protect children from harm. Ultimately, the colonial influence on
Native communities has deeply damaged traditional kinships.
Tribal governments have actually replicated the child protection
systems of the state governments. “The modern attack on the civil
and tribal rights of Indian women of childbearing age on
reservation homelands . . . has often resulted in staggering, violent,
74
misogynistic practices previously unknown to the tribes.” Thus, a
Native mother suffering from addiction, poverty, abuse, or neglect
may be effectively trapped with no viable options for keeping her
family safe. Disclosing the challenges to outside authorities risks
child removal; therefore, from this perspective, it is better not to
seek help. However, this strategy effectively isolates Native women

70. This dynamic is explored in Michele Bograd, Strengthening Domestic
Violence Theories: Intersections of Race, Class, Sexual Orientation and Gender, in
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AT THE MARGINS: READINGS ON RACE, CLASS, GENDER, AND
CULTURE 25, 31 (Natalie J. Sokoloff & Christina Platt eds., 2005) (“[P]sychological
consequences of battering may be compounded by the ‘microaggressions’ of
racism, heterosexism, and classism in and out of the reference group.”).
71. Suzanne L. Cross et al., Working on the Front Lines: The Role of Social Work in
Response to the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, in FACING THE FUTURE: THE INDIAN
CHILD WELFARE ACT AT 30, supra note 41, at 3.
72. EDUARDO DURAN & BONNIE DURAN, NATIVE AMERICAN POSTCOLONIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 8 (1995).
73. Long & Curry, supra note 15, at 211 (noting that all of the Native
American elders who participated in the study perceived the history of federal
policies as having “broke[n] the family circle”).
74. Cook-Lynn, supra note 10, at 110.
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who fear for their well-being and that of their children. With no
intervention, support, or advice, a situation can deteriorate rapidly.
75
This creates a devastating risk for mothers and children.
A system that is supposed to protect and nurture children has
been crudely warped by a patchwork of policies rooted in
superiority and disrespect. No wonder that a Native woman might
avoid seeking help when she is suffering and scared—there are
76
many rational disincentives for seeking help. “Nati[ve] women are
blamed for the difficulties they experience in child-raising, which
in turn obfuscates the roots of these difficulties in the history and
77
current dynamics of colonialism and racial oppression.”
Statistics demonstrate that today’s Native women face
significant barriers to resources and help. Native women and girls
suffer the highest rates of domestic violence and sexual assault in
78
the United States. Native communities suffer the highest rates of
79
poverty, unemployment, and malnutrition in the nation. As a
result, Native women and children are at a heightened risk for
harm. Native infants die at a rate two to three times higher than the
80
rate for white infants. Native women lack equal access to health
81
care, including adequate prenatal care. Mothers and pregnant
75. For example, some tribes (largely influenced by state models) will
prosecute a woman for child neglect for being a victim of domestic violence. See,
e.g., JAMES G. WHITE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF BATTERED NATIVE WOMEN
FOR FAILURE TO PROTECT 1 (2005), available at http://www.swclap.org/pdfs
/FAILURETOPROTECT.pdf. While the intent of such laws may be to protect
children, they also present enormous disincentives for a mother to report abuse or
ask for help. Id. at 8–9. A Native woman might “stay” in an abusive marriage—not
because she lacks self-esteem or has learned helplessness, but because of a welljustified fear of losing custody of her children. See id. at 10.
76. In the Canadian parallel, Kline explains, “[W]hile First Nation women
are often victims of the child welfare system, they are not passive victims.” Kline,
supra note 62, at 316.
77. Id. at 306.
78. Sarah Deer, Criminal Justice in Indian Country, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 375,
377 (2013).
79. See Michelle Sarche & Paul Spicer, Poverty and Health Disparities for
American Indian and Alaska Native Children: Current Knowledge and Future Prospects,
1136 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 126, 127 (2008).
80. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, NATIVE AMERICAN
HEALTH CARE DISPARITIES BRIEFING 14 (2004), available at http://libraries.ucsd.edu
/bib/fed/usccr_natam_disparities.pdf.
81. Amnesty International reports that forty-one percent of American Indian
and Alaska Native women do not receive “adequate prenatal care” as defined by
the federal Healthy People 2010 goals. AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY DELIVERY: THE
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women suffering from chronic psychological distress may have few
options; in some tribal communities, the only mental health care
82
service is emergency psychiatric care.
It is within this historical context that we encounter Dana
Deegan, a Native woman from North Dakota whose personal
tragedy provides a modern day window into the lives and
challenges of Native mothers. Through Dana’s story, we explore
the potential for feminist legal theories and the role of a feminist
lawyer to act as a systemic catalyst for intervention.
III. THE STORY OF UNITED STATES V. DEEGAN
In this section, we focus on the story of one Native woman who
committed the crime of neonaticide. Through her case study, we
hope to better understand how the child protection system and
other legal interventions failed to protect her and her newborn
son.
A.

Dana’s Story

Dana Deegan is an Arikara woman from the Fort Berthold
Reservation in North Dakota who is currently serving a ten-year
sentence in federal prison for a crime that emerged from
83
desperation and tragedy. Dana’s story epitomizes the ultimate
tragic consequence of the historical trauma experienced by her
people—the death of a child. In 1998 Dana was twenty-five years
old with three young daughters, living on a remote and isolated
reservation. In October of that year, Dana gave birth to a fourth
child, a baby boy, alone in the shower of her trailer home. Dana’s
memories of the birth and its aftermath are fragmented and
clouded because of the trauma she had experienced throughout
her life, described more fully below. Suffering from dissociation,
terror, panic, and suicidal thoughts, Dana left the newborn in the
home and fled with her three daughters to a place of refuge with
her mother. When she returned home two weeks later, her baby
MATERNAL HEALTH CARE CRISIS IN THE USA 6 (2010), available at http://www
.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/deadlydelivery.pdf.
82. See OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, supra note 80, at 9.
83. Ms. Deegan’s case is poignantly chronicled by Eighth Circuit Judge
Myron Bright in United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625, 639–45 (8th Cir. 2010)
(Bright, J., dissenting). The facts are drawn from Bright’s dissent, as well as a
report by neonaticide expert Phillip Resnick.
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had died. She kept the incident secret and placed her baby’s body
near a tree so that she could see him from her home.
During the next nine years, Dana’s life substantially improved
due to her strength and resilience. She continued to raise her three
daughters and contributed in meaningful ways to their lives and
the lives of others in her community. She gained more stability
than she had known in the past, received some higher education,
84
and had a full-time job. However, her resilience was cut short. In
1999 the baby’s body was discovered near the home where Dana
and her family lived in 1998. For a variety of reasons, Dana was not
identified as the mother of the baby (through DNA) until 2007.
The federal government prosecuted Dana pursuant to the Major
Crimes Act, which removes major crimes, such as murder, from
tribal jurisdiction, even though the alleged crimes occurred in
Indian Country and were perpetrated by enrolled Indians against
85
other Indians.
After a federal grand jury indicted her on a charge of firstdegree murder, Dana confessed to causing her baby’s (now known
as Moses) death and entered into a plea agreement with the
86
government for a reduced charge of second-degree murder.
Despite numerous mitigating circumstances, Dana was sentenced
87
to over ten years in prison. At her 2008 sentencing hearing, the
judge imposed 121 months after determining that an upward
departure from the federal sentencing guidelines was justified
88
because the crime was “unusually heinous, cruel, and brutal.” She
is currently serving her ten-year sentence in federal prison with a

84. Letter from Marmie Jotter to President Barack Obama (Sept. 11, 2013)
(on file with authors); see also Petition for Clemency and Commutation 12–13, 26
(Mar. 6, 2014) (on file with authors).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2012). Because “major” crimes committed by
Indians on reservations fall under federal jurisdiction, the sentencing structure
varies widely from state law. Therefore, Native people are often punished more
severely than their non-Native counterparts in state court. See, e.g., Edwin L. Hall &
Albert A. Simkus, Inequality in the Types of Sentences Received by Native Americans and
Whites, 13 CRIMINOLOGY 199, 200 (1975).
86. Deegan, 605 F.3d at 628.
87. Id. at 629.
88. Id. at 628 (quoting the district court presentencing order). Moreover, the
U.S. Attorney at the time of the crime described the crime as “violent and vicious”
and described Dana’s actions as heartless. Paul Walsh, N.D. Mom Sentenced in “SlowMotion” Death of Newborn Left Alone for Two Weeks, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis)
(May 13, 2008, 11:05 AM), http://www.startribune.com/local/18894054.html.
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release date of March 6, 2017. Deegan’s supporters have mounted a
89
campaign petitioning President Obama for clemency.
A review of the facts demonstrates that the death of Dana’s
baby was the ultimate tragic outcome of a life marked by extreme
violence, which all took place in the shadow of the catastrophic
history of systemic attacks on Native motherhood.
Dana Deegan is a survivor of horrific emotional, physical, and
90
sexual abuse perpetrated by nearly every man in her life. None of
the perpetrators have ever been held accountable for their actions
91
in the criminal justice system. From an early age, Dana witnessed
and was the victim of extreme domestic violence at the hands of
92
her father. Dana’s father was an alcoholic and ultimately died
93
from complications of this addiction. Her mother would often stay
away at work (she typically worked two jobs) to escape her violent
94
husband. Dana reported seeing her father severely beat her
mother about once a month, resulting in broken bones and
95
blackened eyes. Dana’s father beat her on a daily basis for many
96
years. She learned how to hide serious injuries from school
97
officials and lie about absences. Dana reported that she
experienced what she now believes are dissociations as a result of
98
these beatings.
Dana was also sexually abused by some of her father’s friends
99
between the ages of five and eleven. By the time she was nine
years old, Dana had experienced sexual touching, oral sex, vaginal
100
and anal penetration, and torture. At age eleven, she summoned

89. See, e.g., Stephen J. Lee, Federal Judge Fights for Release of N.D. Indian,
GRAND FORKS HERALD, Oct. 15, 2013, available at LEXIS; FREE DANA DEEGAN,
http://www.freedana.com (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
90. See Letter from Phillip J. Resnick, Dir. of Forensic Psychiatry, Case W.
Reserve Univ. Sch. of Med., to William D. Schmidt, Assistant Fed. Pub. Defender,
Dists. of S.D. & N.D. (Apr. 9, 2008) (on file with authors) (psychological
evaluation documenting Dana’s history of trauma and violence).
91. See id. at 21.
92. Id. at 3–4.
93. Id. at 3.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 4.
96. See id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 4–5.
99. Id. at 5.
100. Id.
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101

the courage to report the abuse to her mother. Her mother felt
102
guilty for not protecting her. When her mother told her father,
he beat one of the accused men severely, almost causing his
103
death. Her father then also lashed out violently against her
104
mother for being “a slut” who let the abuse happen.
As a result of this abuse, Dana was in and out of the foster-care
105
system starting at age eleven. Dana and her siblings were split up
106
during this time. Sometimes her father would stop drinking and
the children would come home for a while—but ultimately he
would resume drinking and the children would be removed
107
again.
Dana met the man who would become the father of her
108
children when she was fifteen.
They began a romantic
relationship, which quickly became abusive. When Dana was
109
seventeen, he assaulted her for the first time. His violence and
substance abuse became a common experience for Dana in the
110
relationship.
She went on to have three daughters with her common-law
111
112
husband, and his violence toward her escalated over time. She
113
had few options for safety. As a foster child herself, Dana knew
firsthand the pain of being removed from a family. She legitimately
feared that disclosing the abuse would separate her from her
114
children. Her husband’s mother, who was a central figure in her
life, provided some stability and support between the beatings (her
husband tended to avoid violence and drinking in front of his
115
mother).

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 7–8, 10.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 19.
See id. at 10.
Id. at 7.
Id.
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As a result of these incidents, Dana began experiencing
depression and post-traumatic stress disorder from a very early
116
117
age. At the time Moses was born, she was severely depressed.
Although she learned she was pregnant around the four-month
mark of her pregnancy, she did not believe or really have the ability
118
to accept that she was pregnant. She made no plans for the birth
119
and did not receive any prenatal care. She reported feeling at the
120
end of her rope. She had been suicidal at various points in her
121
life. She did not think she could care for another baby and knew
she could not go home because of her own father’s physical abuse
122
and drinking. She reports being terrified of losing her three
123
daughters at the time. The violence Dana suffered at the hands of
124
Moses’ father cannot be overstated. At the time of Moses’ birth,
her common-law husband assaulted Dana regularly, took any
money she might have acquired to feed her babies, and spent it on
125
alcohol and drugs (methamphetamine). One can imagine many
scenarios in which Dana’s family could have been quickly split
apart if she were to admit that she needed help. In this light,
Dana’s ultimate, desperate act seemed the only option for saving
her family.
At the time of Moses’ birth, Dana lived in almost complete
geographic isolation from the outside world. She was separated
from other people and had no resources (legal or otherwise). One
unique aspect of Native motherhood is that life on the reservation,
for many mothers, can be lonely and isolated. For many poor
mothers living in urban areas, community resources, while often
scarce, are at least accessible. These mothers also have churches or
other community support groups that help connect women and
provide support.
To better understand Dana’s case, it is helpful to explore the
gendered crime of neonaticide. Although Moses’ death clearly

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 13, 18.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 10.
Id.
See id. at 11.
See id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
Id.
See id. at 10.
Id. at 10, 17.
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meets the definition of neonaticide, Dana’s particular
circumstances as a Native woman differ from the prototypical case
of neonaticide. Therefore, Dana’s distinct story reminds us that
theories cannot fully explain or conceptualize the context and
culture of individual lives.
B.

Neonaticide

“Neonaticide” refers to the killing of an infant within the first
126
twenty-four hours of his or her life. Neonaticide is a type of
filicide, which is the more general term given to parents who kill
127
their children.
Dr. Phillip Resnick, Director of Forensic
Psychiatry at Case Western Reserve University, created the term
128
“neonaticide.” One estimate suggests that between 150 and 300
129
neonaticides occur each year in the United States. Typically,
victims of neonaticide die by strangulation, suffocation, or
130
Neonaticide is almost
abandonment shortly after birth.
131
exclusively a crime committed by the birth mother. In most cases
of neonaticide, the mother had concealed her pregnancy from
others—and even denied it to herself. Rarely is the crime truly
premeditated; in most cases, the crime is an acute reaction to the
shock and fear of the unplanned birth.
Scholars who have looked carefully at case histories of
neonaticide have concluded that there are common “warning
132
signs” that precede the event.
Commonalities among these
crimes include unusual behavior by a pregnant woman, such as
denial of pregnancy and disassociation. Often women who commit
neonaticide are teenagers who are experiencing an unwanted
pregnancy. These young women experience overwhelming feelings

126. Isser & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 581.
127. Id. at 586.
128. Dr. Resnick is one of the leading medical experts on this crime. See
Phillip J. Resnick, Murder of the Newborn: A Psychiatric Review of Neonaticide, 126 AM.
J. PSYCHIATRY 1414, 1419 (1970). This early publication introduced neonaticide as
a gendered crime. Id. at 1414.
129. Isser & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 582.
130. See GEOFFREY R. MCKEE, WHY MOTHERS KILL: A FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGIST’S
CASEBOOK 19–20 (2006); Isser & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 581.
131. See Isser & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 581.
132. See generally id. at 581–84 (describing common symptoms that indicate
“neonaticide syndrome”).
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of shame, guilt, and tremendous fear upon giving birth. Many of
these women report suddenly going into labor in bathrooms or
bedrooms. They often deliver their babies alone—and then either
kill their infants on the day of their births, or wrap their babies in
134
blankets and throw them in the trash to die.
Because neonaticide occurs on the day of the baby’s birth, it is
135
not clear to what extent postpartum mental illness plays a role.
Unlike postpartum psychosis, which has been the underlying cause
of some cases of infanticide (the killing of a child under one year
of age), it seems less likely that postpartum mental disorders are
136
involved with neonaticide. But the physiological responses to
pregnancy and childbirth, which ultimately lead to serious
137
postpartum issues, are likely parts of any neonaticide event.
In the United States, mothers who kill their newborn babies
are often charged with murder and some receive prison sentences
138
for their crimes. However, the actual sentences vary widely. One
study found that convictions ranged from “unlawful disposal of a
139
body” to first-degree murder. Further, the same study found that
sentencing recommendations ranged from intensive therapy to a
140
Lengthy sentences for
prison sentence of thirty-four years.
murder are imposed in some cases despite clear evidence of the
mother’s distress and shock at the time of the birth, and also in
many cases, evidence of prior abuse or trauma experienced by the
133. See id. at 581–82.
134. Id. at 581–83.
135. See id. at 587 (finding that postpartum symptoms appear shortly after
birth).
136. Michelle Oberman, “Lady Madonna, Children at Your Feet”: Tragedies at the
Intersection of Motherhood, Mental Illness and the Law, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 33, 36, 38 (2003) (finding the majority of mothers who kill their children while
suffering from postpartum mental illness commit infanticide rather than
neonaticide). Oberman also discusses the fact that neonaticide and other crimes
that women commit against their young children are often the result of both
psychological and social circumstances. Id. at 35, 53.
137. See id. at 55–56 (finding postpartum mental illness is often just one more
destabilizing factor in the lives of mothers who are already mentally ill before
giving birth).
138. Christine A. Fazio & Jennifer L. Comito, Rethinking the Tough Sentencing of
Teenage Neonaticide Offenders in the United States, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3109, 3136–37
(1999).
139. Id. at 3142 (citing Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms
with Modern American Infanticide, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (1996)).
140. Id. at 3142–43.
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141

mother during her pregnancy.
Intense media coverage of
142
Media
neonaticide crimes has been increasingly prevalent.
attention may affect sentencing, given how harshly mothers who
kill their babies are treated in the news; judges and juries may be
consciously or unconsciously taking this information into their
decisions. There seems to be some difference in sentencing
outcomes between cases tried in state versus federal court, as well as
143
those tried in juvenile court, in the cases of teenage mothers.
Sentencing regimes in federal court are stricter than state court.
The federal government typically prosecutes murders that occur
within a tribal jurisdiction. Thus, Native mothers are likely to
144
receive harsher sentences than white women tried in state court.
The United States’ response to neonaticide differs from the
response of some other countries. England, Australia, Canada, and
145
Hong Kong, for example, have enacted infanticide acts. In both
England and Hong Kong, women charged and convicted under
these acts often receive lenient sentences, consisting of probation
146
with psychiatric treatment required.
The origins of these
147
infanticide statutes are based on a two-pronged rationale. One,
from a policy perspective, there was concern about the harsh
treatment in the criminal justice system of young, single, and low148
income women. The second consideration was the psychiatric
issues that could be occurring in these cases during the birthing
process—which occurs mostly alone for women who kill their
149
newborns. As will be discussed in more detail later in this paper,
141. Margaret Ryznar, A Crime of Its Own? A Proposal for Achieving Greater
Sentencing Consistency in Neonaticide and Infanticide Cases, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 459, 461
(2013); see, e.g., United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625, 640 n.10 (8th Cir. 2010)
(Bright, J., dissenting) (“Twenty-four year old patient comes in to evaluate injuries
sustained in an altercation with her boyfriend last night. She is 37 weeks
pregnant.” (quoting Deegan’s medical records)).
142. See, e.g., Jocelyn Renee Lewis, Media Representation of Maternal
Neonaticide (May 2008) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Texas A&M University),
available at http://repository.tamu.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/85970/Lewis
.pdf.
143. See Fazio & Comito, supra note 138, at 3142–46; Ryznar, supra note 141,
at 469–77.
144. Deegan, 605 F.3d at 657–58 (Bright, J., dissenting).
145. Fazio & Comito, supra note 138, at 3137.
146. Id. at 3140.
147. Id. at 3138.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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infanticide acts are a clear example of the cultural or difference150
based feminist legal theory in practice. There are no “infanticide
specific” laws in the United States. However, all fifty states have
adopted “safe haven” laws whereby a parent can leave an unwanted
151
newborn at a safe place in complete anonymity.
Neonaticide also affects other children and the family of the
woman who commits this act. Other children of this woman are
now in very real danger of losing their mother. First, the mother
may be sentenced to a long prison stay. If the mother is fortunate
enough to remain in the community with probation or some other
alternative disposition, CPS in many states defines the killing of a
152
newborn baby as “egregious harm.” When there is a determination of egregious harm made, the state will move quickly to
terminate the parental rights of the parent who is found to have
153
caused this harm. This scenario—sometimes called a “fast track”
termination—often means that the state is relieved of its obligation
154
to provide any efforts to try to reunify mother and child. Thus, a
woman who kills her newborn and has other children may lose the
rights to these children without an opportunity to prove her ability
to parent in a meaningful way.
In Dana’s case, some of the events of Moses’ conception,
pregnancy, and death clearly fit within the clinical understanding
of neonaticide. However, others do not. Consistent with most cases,
Dana had not told others about her pregnancy, and it appears as
155
though she denied being pregnant even to herself. She did not
150. See infra Part IV.A.
151. Susan Ayres, Kairos and Safe Havens: The Timing and Calamity of Unwanted
Birth, 15 WM. MARY J. WOMEN & L. 227, 250 (2008); Isser & Schwartz, supra note 2,
at 582. The story of Moses was one of the high-profile cases that helped inspire
North Dakota’s Safe Haven Law. Jenny Michael, Case Helped Inspire Safe Haven Law,
BISMARCK TRIB., May 18, 2007, at A1, available at LEXIS.
152. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1(b)(6) (2012) (codifying the
egregious harm termination standard). Many states have similar provisions that
allow a filing of a termination of parental rights petition if there has been a
finding of egregious harm. Egregious harm is defined in section 260C.007
subdivision 14.
153. See id. § 260C.301, subdiv. 1(b)(6).
154. William Michael Vesneski, Judging Parents: Courts, Child Welfare, and
Criteria for Terminating Parental Rights 6 (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Washington), available at https://digital.lib.washington.edu
/researchworks/bitstream/handle/1773/22572/Vesneski_washington_0250E
_10838.pdf.
155. See Letter from Phillip J. Resnick, supra note 90, at 10. Dr. Resnick
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receive prenatal care, nor did she prepare herself for the birth. She
reports dissociation at the time of the birth and very little existing
156
memory as to the exact events of that day. She reports feeling
157
overwhelmed by the circumstances of the pregnancy and birth. It
158
is unclear whether this pregnancy was coerced.
159
However, Dana was not a teenager at the time of the birth.
This was not her first child, nor her first experience with labor.
Dana did not immediately kill her baby in a violent or quick
160
manner. We will never know to what extent postpartum mental
health disorders affected the events of Moses’ birth. While Dana
provided some information during her sentencing about her
161
motivations at the time of the birth, it is impossible to know what
really happened because of the level of dissociation and trauma at
the time. What we do know is that Dana was not in a situation
either before or immediately after the birth to seek or receive help.
She was completely alone. She also stated that she was terrified of
162
losing her daughters to CPS. Dana herself entered the foster care
system at age eleven after reporting the sexual and physical abuse
163
she experienced. This further trauma of being removed from her
mother and siblings likely made Dana extremely wary of reaching

included the detailed findings of his psychiatric evaluation of Dana Deegan in a
letter to William D. Schmidt, Assistant Federal Prosecutor at the Deegan federal
criminal trial. This letter was a part of the trial record.
156. Id. at 11.
157. Id.
158. Coercive reproduction is defined as “behaviors that a partner uses to
maintain power and control” over a partner’s reproductive health or reproductive
decision making and includes behaviors intended to pressure or coerce a partner
into becoming a parent or ending a pregnancy. Coercive reproduction is a
form of domestic violence. Tools for Educators: Intimate Partner Violence and
Coercive Reproduction, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.org
/resources/research-papers/relationship-abuse-26786.htm (last visited Mar. 16,
2014).
159. See Letter from Phillip J. Resnick, supra note 90, at 3, 10 (stating that
Dana was born on May 5, 1973 and that Moses was born October 20, 1998); see also
id. at 94.
160. See United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 2010).
161. Id. at 628 (recounting that Deegan asked for leniency in sentencing
based on “her ‘psychological and emotional condition’ at the time of the offense,
her history as a victim of abuse, and the fact that she acted impulsively, among
other reasons”).
162. Letter from Phillip J. Resnick, supra note 90, at 10, 21.
163. See id. at 5.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

27

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 4

970

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:3

out for help as an adult with children of her own. This memory of
trauma in her childhood also represents a clear example of
historical trauma effecting the choices and life of an individual
Native woman.
Dana’s story presents an opportunity to look at the effects of
164
historical trauma on the life of one Native woman. In doing so,
we begin to understand how historical trauma, in combination with
Dana’s own personal abuse, created extreme circumstances that
resulted in desperate actions. Dana experienced multiple layers of
oppression. We cannot view Dana simply as a generic woman in a
generic legal system. To truly understand her circumstances,
choices, and the judicial response to her actions, we need to break
through a one-dimensional analysis to view her story as that of a
Native mother, with all the historical trauma and unique individual
trauma that comes along with this unique role in our society.
IV. FEMINIST LAWYERING THEORIES AND PRACTICE
I represent “bad mothers” because I need the truths
they tell me concerning our common culture. They tell
truths by exposing to me our likeness and our differences.
I see myself reflected in them sometimes, recognizing in
their gestures and their attitudes variations of ones
familiar to me because they are my own. Beyond that,
though, in their difference they tell me truths. They tell
me truths when they refuse to let me see who they are,
when they hold up a mirror facing me, between
themselves and me, so that I confront that mirror as a
barrier. It tells me of my situatedness in our culture. It
reminds me of realities of class and of race, for example,
that impede my understanding of my client and hers of
me, that impede our working together and my adequately
representing her. It reminds me that however much I
know and care for her, there are ways in which I do not
understand her. . . . She is familiar to me in myself and
165
she is a mystery—which is why I want to know her.

164. See generally LUANA ROSS, INVENTING THE SAVAGE: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF NATIVE AMERICAN CRIMINALITY (1998) (providing a larger study
of how Native women are entrapped by the criminal justice system).
165. Marie Ashe, “Bad Mothers,” “Good Lawyers,” and “Legal Ethics,” 81 GEO.
L.J. 2533, 2566 (1993) (emphasis added).
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At the core of Dana’s case is the story of a Native woman and
mother living in constant fear and danger, in extreme poverty, and
without access to support, legal or otherwise. She exists in the
world as someone aware of the historical trauma of Native women
through time, and this historical context is a part of her individual
story. Examining Dana’s life story and crime through the lens of
feminist legal theories may help us understand what could have
been done to better help Dana and her family. We conclude that
theories focusing on context and intersectionality provide the most
relevant framework for the type of holistic, feminist lawyering that
may have best helped Dana and other women like her.
Considering feminist approaches to this type of tragedy is one
way to help elicit a policy reform needed in the way our child
166
protection system responds to women in crisis. However, this
paper does not explicitly discuss how child protection systems
could be improved to help Native mothers. Instead, we focus on
how feminist lawyers could help Native women. It is our hope that
improving the practice of representing women like Dana will
impact the child protection system and the way that system
perceives, treats, and delivers services to Native women and their
families.
We begin this section by discussing a general framework for
understanding prevalent feminist legal theories that Dana’s
circumstances implicate. This framework is followed by a
consideration of how feminist legal theories can inform lawyering
practices.
A.

Feminist Legal Theories of Equality and Difference

At its core, legal feminism stands for the principle that all
human beings should be treated with “equality, respect and
167
justice.” These principles have helped many social movements
168
change political and civil society. Feminism, in its early stages of

166. See Elizabeth Rapaport, Mad Women and Desperate Girls: Infanticide and
Child Murder in Law and Myth, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 545 (2005–2006) (“If the
protection of children were our primary concern, we would concentrate attention
on the conditions that produce severe child abuse and the children who may be
living at risk.”).
167. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mainstreaming Feminist Legal Theory, 23 PAC.
L.J. 1493, 1497 (1991–1992).
168. Id.
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litigation and theory, focused on the notion of “sameness”—that
169
men and women are the same and should have equal rights.
Equality feminism, the oldest of the main branches of feminist
theories, is based on the fundamental belief that “providing women
legal rights against discrimination represents the extent to which
undesirable social and economic conditions affecting women can
170
be eliminated by legal change.” Equality feminists focus on the
oppression of women within the construct of the law. The goal of
early feminist litigation was to eliminate bias or preferences in the
law that favored men over women. This theory is helpful for women
who are being denied equal treatment under the law. The
limitations of this early theory were soon seen, however, and a
second, more nuanced theory emerged to address the real and
171
unique differences between men and women. The development
of new theories was predicated on a more specific political goal:
172
end sexist oppression in all its forms.
Cultural- or biological-difference-based feminism seeks to
improve the position of women “through legal and social strategies
173
which validate women’s differences from men.” The first rift in
174
consensus among early feminist theorists occurred when some
feminists wanted to explore the differences that gender presented
175
with pregnant women. Catherine MacKinnon was among the first
of feminist legal scholars to clearly call out and question how
176
conventional legal categories reinforced patriarchy. She argued
that legal categories created by men defined rules that limited
169. Id. at 1497–98.
170. JUDITH G. GREENBERG ET AL., FRUG’S WOMEN AND THE LAW 57 (2d ed.
1998).
171. Indeed, one Native critique of mainstream feminism is that “the concept
of equality is neither relevant nor necessary for Aboriginal women in Aboriginal
societies; rather these are concepts imposed by the colonizers, including
feminists.” Verna St. Denis, Feminism Is for Everybody: Aboriginal Women, Feminism and
Diversity, in MAKING SPACE FOR INDIGENOUS FEMINISM, supra note 12, at 38.
172. See BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 26 (1984).
173. GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 170, at 57.
174. See Jenna Basiliere, Political Is Personal: Scholarly Manifestations of the
Feminist Sex Wars, 22 MICH. FEMINIST STUD. 1, 1 (2009) (noting the rift between
feminist theorists).
175. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 386–95
(3d ed. 2012).
176. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination,
in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CIVIL RIGHTS 88 (Robert K. Fullinwider & Claudia
Mills eds., 1986).
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women’s legal rights. She and others began to diverge from
“equality” feminists. MacKinnon’s work looking at sexual
harassment as workplace discrimination forced the legal feminist
movement to reevaluate the legal system—through a feminist lens.
MacKinnon focused on power and dominance relations in her
scholarship on sexual harassment and rape. However, more
generally, a second category of feminist legal theory was born—
177
focusing on women being different.
Some feminist theorists have objected to MacKinnon’s theories
of difference because they do not take enough into account the
178
issue of race, class, and culture. In response to concerns about
the limitations of existing feminist legal theory, a new school of
179
thought has emerged, known as intersectional feminism.
Intersectional feminist legal scholars have emerged from, and been
informed by, the critical race theory movement, but have an
independent methodology through which both gender and race
are the central focal points for analysis. The strength of an
intersectionality approach is that it allows both race and gender to
be considered in tandem, bringing attention to the injustices that
often come with being a woman of color in any legal system. In
recent years, feminist theorists like Kimberlé Crenshaw have
introduced the concept of intersectionality as a way to understand
180
the experience of women of color in the justice system. Crenshaw
seeks to contrast black women’s experiences in what she finds to be
181
a single-axis analysis in the law. Her work and theories are useful
when looking at the experiences of Native women.
Indigenous feminism has been emerging in the
interdisciplinary academic world more recently, but has its roots in
182
precolonial conceptions of gender. Like intersectional feminism,
177. Id. at 81.
178. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory,
42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (critiquing MacKinnon’s analysis of a seminal
Indian law case, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez); Francine R. Skenandore, Revisiting
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Feminist Perspectives on Tribal Sovereignty, 17 WIS.
WOMEN’S L.J. 347, 355–58 (2002) (same).
179. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 166 (1989).
180. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1245 (1991).
181. See id. at 1242–45.
182. See Martell & Deer, supra note 12, at 816.
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indigenous feminism considers gender and race—but also
183
considers the role of colonization in the lives of Native women. A
legal theory informed by indigenous feminism best explains Dana’s
story and explores potential legal remedies for her experience.
Trying to understand a case like Dana’s using a feminist model that
is not informed by colonization would fall short. Dana’s experience
being a racial minority, for example, may not play nearly as
significant a role in her life as the history of child removal in tribal
communities. Considering colonization without gender is likewise
problematic. Dana’s experience as a Native mother is vastly
different than that of Native men or fathers. In particular, in
Dana’s case, she bore the brunt of the child rearing and, therefore,
also bore all the risk should her poverty, abuse, or trauma be used
against her by the State. She simply had more on the line because
of her position as a Native mother.
An intersectional feminist approach is simultaneously useful
because it allows us to consider the history of the child protection
system from the perspective of Native women. In order to better
understand Dana’s experience, we must also consider her
experiences as a Native woman in the criminal justice system. Dana,
like many women in the criminal justice system, arrived as a result
of trauma.
B.

Women and the Criminal Justice System

A national profile provides the following characteristics of
184
women offenders. They are disproportionally women of color in
their early to mid-thirties. Most have fragmented family histories
with other family members often involved in the criminal justice
185
system.
Many are survivors of sexual and physical abuse as
children and adults, and most have significant substance abuse or
183. See, e.g., Mishuana R. Goeman & Jennifer Nez Denetdale, Guest Editors’
Introduction, Native Feminism: Legacies, Interventions, and Indigenous Sovereignties, 24
WICAZO SA REV., Fall 2009, at 9, 10; Joyce Green, Taking Account of Aboriginal
Feminism, in MAKING SPACE FOR INDIGENOUS FEMINISMS, supra note 12, at 20
(“Aboriginal feminists raise issues of colonialism, racism and sexism, and the
unpleasant synergy between these three violations of human rights.”).
184. Stephanie Covington, The Relational Theory of Women’s Psychological
Development: Implications for the Criminal Justice System, in FEMALE OFFENDERS:
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES & EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS 135, 137–38 (Ruth Zaplin ed.,
2d ed. 2007).
185. Id. at 137.
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mental health problems. Many have only high school diplomas or
GEDs. In sum, most women in the system are young, poor,
undereducated, and nonwhite, who have complex histories of
186
trauma, mental health, and addiction. Dana’s life story fits into
this paradigm—in particular, those relating to fragmented family,
severe physical and psychological trauma, and mental health
problems that exacerbated an already precarious situation.
In this section, we address gender as it relates to charging and
sentencing, feminist legal theories that have affected women in the
criminal justice system, and how trauma is often a catalyst for entry
into the criminal justice system for many women.
1.

Gender in Charging and Sentencing

There is a rich debate about the value of using gender in
decisions of charging and sentencing. In the United States, we
generally do not consider gender explicitly in our criminal codes or
charging decisions. This differs, as mentioned earlier in this article,
187
from England and Australia, where infanticide laws exist. These
laws clearly incorporate notions of cultural or different feminist
legal theory. That is, they recognize that immediately after the birth
of a baby, in certain circumstances, hormones, postpartum
depression and psychosis, and other gendered differences have real
188
and significant impacts on the events leading up to a crime. As
such, when a mother kills a newborn immediately after birth, the
laws of these countries explicitly recognize that gender matters and
should be considered. They then go on to provide different
outcomes for women in these circumstances based on these
189
biological differences.
Sentencing in the United States presents a different picture
than charging. Although in most states and at the federal level,
sentencing guidelines are determined based on severity levels and
criminal history, there are clearly situations where gender, and in
particular motherhood, are considered in sentencing or in the
actual finding of guilt. Examples of this include battered women’s

186. Id. at 138.
187. Isser & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 577; see supra note 145 and
accompanying text.
188. Isser & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 587–89.
189. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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190

syndrome and postpartum psychosis.
Battered women’s
syndrome is recognized as an affirmative defense to murder in
191
some jurisdictions. Postpartum psychosis has been considered in
both the guilt phase (as a defense of mental insanity) and in the
sentencing phase in several high profile cases of filicide, including
192
the Andrea Yates case.
2.

Feminist Theories and Criminal Justice

Feminist legal theories have addressed criminal justice issues,
although often in the context of men as compared to white
193
women. What has resulted in the context of female homicide is
some strife between theorists who think men and women should be
treated equally in the criminal courts, and those who think that
women are different and should have special consideration in the
194
courts.
This analysis has not often enough included an
examination of intersectionality or the double stigma that Native
women experience in the criminal justice system. A framework that
includes just the experiences of white women misses the historical
context so important to truly understanding the experiences and
realities of Native women in the criminal justice system—
195
particularly those who are incarcerated.
Some traditional biological theories of gender and crime
address the differences between men and women who commit

190. BRENDA L. RUSSELL, BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AS A LEGAL
DEFENSE 18–22 (2010); Oberman, supra note 136, at 63–65.
191. RUSSELL, supra note 190, at 6.
192. Oberman, supra note 136, at 39–43.
193. Stephanie S. Covington & Barbara E. Bloom, Gendered Justice: Women in the
Criminal Justice System, in GENDERED JUSTICE: ADDRESSING FEMALE OFFENDERS 3, 5–7
(Barbara E. Bloom ed., 2003); Kolleen Duley, Gender and Criminality, 18 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 273, 274 (2012).
194. Isser & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 580.
195. It is difficult to gather quantitative data about incarcerated Native
women. Julie C. Abril, Native American Indian Women: Implications for Prison Research,
4 SW. J. CRIM. JUST., no. 2, 2007, at 133, 134. Evidence suggests that Native women
are “over-incarcerated” (incarcerated at higher per capita rates than other races),
but comprehensive data is not always available, sometimes because prison systems
primarily release statistics dealing with white and black offenders. For example,
former Yokuts prisoner Stormy Ogden explained that her racial classification in
the California correctional system was “other.” Stormy Ogden, Prisoner W20170/Other, in SHARING OUR STORIES OF SURVIVAL 149, 157 (Sarah Deer et al. eds.,
2008).
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crimes, in particular, crimes against their children.
These
traditional comparisons emphasize that social, cultural, economic,
and political environments contribute to gendered homicide. In
particular, poverty, lack of education, parental neglect, domestic
violence, and drug or alcohol addiction are “potent” factors in the
causes of homicide of children for both men and women—but
women are burdened by stereotypical expectations of their roles
and by a lack of economic independence that make these factors
197
more pronounced in situations where women kill. Still others feel
that the differences between men and women in the system are not
just based on social factors, but biological factors as well.
Biological theorists, such as Carol Gilligan, believe that
women’s psychological needs and biological roles are imprinted
198
genetically. She and others believe that men and women are
hardwired differently—and that these biological differences
manifest themselves in different behaviors. So in the case of a
woman who kills her child, this woman’s behavior can be
understood from a biological perspective and may make her
199
actions less culpable than a man’s in a similar situation. However,
this theory does not provide a meaningful place to assess the
experience of Native women who commit crimes against their
children. Further context is needed to understand the personal
and historic traumas that play into scenarios involving Native
women in the criminal justice system.
3.

Trauma as a Pathway to Prison

Some feminists, like Stephanie Covington, have contributed
significant understanding to women’s traumas as they relate to
200
their involvement in the criminal justice system. Covington’s
work has shown us that trauma plays a major role in women’s
entries into the criminal system and that an understanding of the
unique trauma experienced by women is needed to prevent their

196.
197.
198.

Isser & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 577.
Id. at 579.
See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982) (calling attention to “the discrepant
data on women’s experience” and providing “a basis upon which to generate [a]
new theory”).
199. Id.
200. Covington, supra note 184, at 135.
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entries into the system, or to assist in programming and services to
201
treat women in the system or after their releases.
Covington has demonstrated success in developing genderresponsive programming for women in the criminal justice
202
system.
Her approach focuses on several core principles
including recognizing the unique needs and experiences of
women; acknowledging the female perspective, such as recovery
from trauma; and respecting the unique ways that females develop
203
psychologically.
She defines gender-responsive programming,
including what is used to try to prevent entry into the criminal
justice system, as that which seeks to provide equality in terms of
204
furnishing opportunities that mean the same to each gender.
205
She
This legitimizes differences between men and women.
advocates creating environments for women that focus on
relationships with other people and keeping these core
relationships with others intact and healthy. She also emphasizes
that any programming or treatment must include recovery from
206
trauma.
Covington’s work is holistic. It seeks to provide women with
the tools necessary to succeed in many aspects of their lives. By
learning how to deal with individual trauma and addiction in the
context of developing healthy and safe relationships, she empowers
207
women to understand their own histories of abuse in a new way.
She has developed curriculum to help women work through their
past traumas and to help lead them to an understanding of their
past choices and behaviors in the context of these traumas. Her
hope is that this understanding allows women to move beyond the
traumas to create lives lived on their terms as opposed to lives lived
in constant cycles of repeating trauma.
However, her theories relating to trauma are not sufficiently
intersectional in the context of the experiences of Native women.

201. Id. at 154–57.
202. Id. at 157.
203. Id. at 154–57.
204. Id. at 141.
205. Id.
206. Stephanie S. Covington, A Woman’s Journey Home: Challenges for Female
Offenders, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED: THE IMPACT OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY
ON CHILDREN, FAMILIES, AND COMMUNITIES 67, 95 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul
eds., 2003).
207. Covington, supra note 184, at 156–57.
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She does not overlay the experiences of Native women as opposed
to other women or men. Her work is extraordinarily valuable in
understanding that men and women commit crimes for very
different reasons and that women have vastly different needs to
recover from past traumas, but it does not inform our
understanding of how racially based, historical trauma plays into a
crime committed by a Native woman. Covington’s work helps us
understand how individual traumas act as a trigger for many
women. What we need to understand and implement when
working with Native mothers is another layer, incorporating their
individual circumstances, including past traumas, but also how the
historical trauma of colonial practices affects their choices and
208
lives.
C.

Feminist Lawyering

Feminist legal theories can inform practice. We have seen
historically that feminism has inspired successful litigation and
advocacy. Pioneers such as Ruth Bader Ginsberg used theories of
equality feminism to successfully litigate workplace sex discrimi209
nation. Reproductive rights and access to birth control and
abortion represent a second wave of successful feminist theory in
210
practice. In the reproductive rights cases, there was a focus on the
211
biological differences between men and women. We believe that
Crenshaw’s intersectional approach, when informed by indigenous
feminism, can inform a model of holistic practice that helps Native
women.
1.

Holistic Lawyering

“Holistic lawyering” can take many forms. It generally refers to
a practice that is client centered and not limited by case
208. See generally ROSS, supra note 164. This intervention has been identified in
the field of psychology: “Successful clinical interventions are not possible in a
Native American setting unless the provider or agency is cognizant of the
sociohistorical factors that have had a devastating effect on the dynamics of the
Native American family.” DURAN & DURAN, supra note 72, at 27.
209. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 175, at 35.
210. See generally id. ch. 4 (“The Generation of Difference”); id. ch. 9
(“Applied Feminist Legal Scholarship: Motherhood and Reproduction”).
211. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); MARGARET SANGER, WOMEN AND
THE NEW RACE 2 (1920).
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212

specificity. Two fundamental components seem to appear in
many holistic models of practice—advocacy through inter213
disciplinary work and a presence in the client community. In
many holistic models, making a long-term difference in the lives of
214
clients is a goal. Holistic lawyering has come about in large part
because of the pressing needs of indigent clients. In the criminal
context, many poor people charged with crimes also face mental
health struggles, addiction, child protection involvement, loss of
housing, and other collateral consequences of their criminal
charges. The holistic mindset, as explained by Michael Pinard in
the context of representing indigent criminal defendants, takes
into account the social, psychological, and socioeconomic factors
215
that often underlay criminal cases. Thus, the practice of holistic
lawyering seeks to put clients’ legal and non-legal needs at the
forefront. Improving the client’s overall position is a goal of both
216
attorney and client.
The practice of holistic lawyering is also understood to mean a
lawyer harmonizing his or her legal practice with his or her
217
innermost values. Using this view of holistic lawyering, a lawyer
218
creates a practice with a more humanist philosophy. The goals
are not about winning or losing or the adversarial system, but
instead about the focus on obtaining just goals through
collaborative communication and work. Holistic lawyering in this
sense relates not only to providing client-centered representation,
but also focuses on how the lawyer engages in practice. It considers
the lawyer’s level of satisfaction with his or her practice as an
219
integral part of the holistic equation.

212. Robin G. Steinberg, Beyond Lawyering: How Holistic Representation Makes for
Good Policy, Better Lawyers, and More Satisfied Clients, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 625, 630 (2006).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 628.
215. Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral
Consequences and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067,
1071 (2004).
216. Id. at 1093; see also id. at 1067 n.2 (citing Erik Luna, The Practice of
Restorative Justice: Punishment Theory, Holism and the Procedural Conception of
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 283).
217. See J. KIM WRIGHT, LAWYERS AS PEACEMAKERS: PRACTICING HOLISTIC,
PROBLEM-SOLVING LAW 303 (2010).
218. Id.
219. Michael L. Perlin, Stepping Outside the Box: Viewing Your Client in a Whole

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss3/4

38

Woolman and Deer: Protecting Native Mothers and Their Children: A Feminist Lawyerin

2014]

PROTECTING NATIVE MOTHERS

981

We find both philosophies useful in thinking about a model of
feminist representation that could help Native women like Dana.
We see value in a client-centered practice that considers the very
real social, psychological, and socioeconomic factors at play with
any client in the criminal justice system, and this should include an
awareness of the historical trauma experienced in Native
220
communities.
We also recognize the importance of keeping
lawyers themselves balanced and healthy, in particular in situations
where they are representing women who have suffered extreme
trauma and abuse. Recognizing and being able to provide self-care
for secondary trauma will need to be integrated into these lawyers’
221
practices.

New Light, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 65, 68 (2000).
220. Trauma-informed legal advocacy provides a framework for representing
clients who have experienced extreme violence, which includes framing advocacy
around the past injury of clients rather than their sickness or badness. SANDRA L.
BLOOM, PHILA. DEP’T OF BEHAVIORAL HEALTH TRAUMA TASK FORCE, TRAUMAINFORMED SYSTEMS TRANSFORMATION: RECOVERY AS A PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERN 16–17
(2006), available at http://www.sanctuaryweb.com/PDFs_new/Bloom%20Trauma
-Informed%20Systems%20Transformation%20in%20Philadelphia.pdf.
221. Attorneys experiencing secondary trauma may experience anxiety, loss of
sleep, increased fear, lack of personal and professional confidence, depression,
and other physical symptoms. Empathy is the key factor in the transfer of
traumatic experiences to another person. Creating a support network to deal with
vicarious trauma is an essential part of a practice for attorneys working with clients
who have been traumatized or are experiencing trauma. Attorneys must be
mindful of their own self-care. Secondary trauma that is untreated can have
devastating effects on the life of the attorney. See, e.g., Marjorie A. Silver et al.,
Stress, Burnout, Vicarious Trauma, and Other Emotional Realities in the Lawyer/Client
Relationship, 19 TOURO L. REV. 847, 853–54 (2004). Attorneys experiencing
vicarious trauma should seek help. Arin Greenwood, Ripple Effects: Education and
Self-Care Can Help Lawyers Avoid Internalizing Client Trauma, 92 A.B.A. J., Jan. 2006,
at 20, 20; see also JOSEPHINE G. PRYCE ET AL., SECONDARY TRAUMATIC STRESS AND THE
CHILD WELFARE PROFESSIONAL 50–51 (2007) (child welfare professionals); Sandra
L. Bloom, Caring for the Caregiver: Avoiding and Treating Vicarious Traumatization, in
SEXUAL ASSAULT: VICTIMIZATION ACROSS THE LIFESPAN 459 (Angelo P. Giardino et al.
eds., 2003) (clinicians, hospital workers, and law enforcement personnel); Andrew
P. Levin & Scott Greisberg, Vicarious Trauma in Attorneys, 24 PACE L. REV. 245,
251–52 (2003); Lisa McCann & Laurie Anne Pearlman, Vicarious Traumatization:
A Framework for Understanding the Psychological Effects of Working with Victims,
3 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 131, 132 (1990) (mental health professionals).
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Representing Native Women

In a holistic model for Native women, an awareness of
historical trauma should be central to the representation. This
means that in every decision and interaction an attorney has, he or
she should be aware of the implications of colonialism on the
222
individuals and their family. For example, when examining a
Native mother’s decision to not seek help or report abuse, the
lawyer should understand that, historically, these have been
dangerous choices in the Native community. In the context of
representing a Native mother for whom a child has been removed
from her home, or who is a victim of domestic violence, it is
essential that the system is attentive to the unique characteristics of
223
Native mothers who have experienced historical trauma. This
advocacy demands that the system and finder of fact consider the
context and complexity of the experiences of Native mothers,
including the effects of historical trauma on these women and
communities. Thus, an intersectional framework is necessary—one
that incorporates the dual reality of clients who are Native and who
are women. This intersection could also include the unique
characteristics of mothers and motherhood.
Dana’s case provides a unique opportunity to reflect on what a
holistic model of representation using an intersectional feminist
approach might look like. Sadly, an attorney or advocate could
have started representing Dana from the time she was born. The
early abuse she suffered and the toxicity of her biological family
224
presented challenges very early in her life. This is part of what
makes her story so compelling. We can see the implications of
historical trauma played out in her life. Dana herself was a victim of
extreme trauma, but her own life reflects that realities of colonial

222. Effective lawyers for Native people should also consider the dynamics of
the local community in which the client resides. See Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the]
Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous Communities, 24 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 229, 245 (2000).
223. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 141–42 (explaining that black women do not
experience problems merely as a minority or as a female, but unique challenges as
minority females).
224. United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625, 639 (8th Cir. 2010) (Bright, J.,
dissenting).
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225

trauma played out in many Native communities. Because of this
duality, she represents a distinct scenario to study communal and
individual trauma in a legal system through a lens of feminist
practice.
Legal intervention could include the actions of an attorney
and/or the actions of the State. There are many points in Dana’s
life where legal intervention could have made a significant
difference. However, it is unlikely that traditional legal models of
representation would have been effective in Dana’s case because
these models do not provide enough context about her particular
trauma, both historical and individual. We feel that a practice
centered by Native women’s unique experiences and grounded
with the knowledge of historical trauma would have provided a
more effective advocate to Dana at several critical points in her life.
The first point at which a holistic and intersectional approach
may have been effective was in protecting Dana, her mother, and
226
her siblings from the abuse of her father. While it is true that
child protection intervened on numerous occasions to place Dana
and her siblings in foster care, the ultimate issues of her father’s
domestic abuse and chemical abuse were not dealt with in a way
that allowed Dana or her family to be free from the threat of future
abuse. Nor did any attorney try to advocate for her mother or Dana
in a way that acknowledged the lingering threat that colonial
systems represented in their lives. This meant that even after
leaving foster care, or aging out of the system, Dana never felt safe
returning home to live with her mother because her father
continued to be a danger to her. It also meant that the underlying
fear that Dana, her mother, and her siblings felt about their family
being forever torn apart—as had happened to so many others—was
not given a voice or place in the legal system.
How can a mother reach out for help from the legal or social
systems about potential harm to her children? The professionals

225. See id. at 662 (“This case also lifts the curtain on the terrible abuse
suffered by Ms. Deegan as a young child and young woman on the Fort Berthold
Indian Reservation in North Dakota. Unfortunately, her suffering is not an
isolated instance. The pervasive and terrible abuse of women and children occurs
on every Indian reservation in this country.”)
226. Id. at 628 (majority opinion) (“She based her argument for leniency on
what she described as her ‘psychological and emotional condition’ at the time of
the offense, her history as a victim of abuse, and the fact that she acted
impulsively, among other reasons.”).
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who have access to resources for help are typically also mandatory
reporters—including social workers, medical care providers, and
police officers. A woman who struggles to protect her children—
227
from her partner, from poverty, or from her own mental illness—
risks losing her children if she discloses the painful truth of her
228
existence. If, for instance, she admits to a helping professional: “I
am overwhelmed; I am not able to be a good parent right now” or
“I am fearful that my children are in danger,” she will likely be
faced with potential removal of her children and/or criminal
charges. Access to people who are not mandatory reporters thus
becomes a matter of life and death.
Part of what is hard to know in this case is how the experience
of being a Native woman living on a reservation would have
affected any legal intervention. It is clear that Native women have
229
good reason to distrust state intervention. It is also clear that for
many Native women, securing an attorney for any type of case is
nearly impossible given the lack of resources and isolated locations
230
of many reservations. It is naïve to think that an attorney in any
circumstance can save a child or a family, but certainly the right
attorney in many circumstances can achieve fundamental changes
in a family’s or individual’s life. But, in a Native community, this
sort of practice will take years to establish, and will require the
commitment of both time and emotional energy of many dedicated
and empathetic attorneys. It will also take significant and
sustainable funding, which is currently often unavailable to Native
231
communities.
The second time that intersectional feminist and holistic legal
representation may have helped Dana is when she experienced
232
domestic violence at the hands of her children’s father. Would
Dana herself have been open to a legal advocate to help her
navigate the system? In this instance, an attorney would need to
balance Dana’s deep distrust of the system (the same system that
separated her family into foster care when she reported abuse as a

227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See id. at 627–28.
See id. at 642 (Bright, J., dissenting).
Horejsi et al., supra note 20, at 330–31.
Id. at 339.
JANET RENO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVITALIZING COMMUNITIES:
INNOVATIVE STATE AND LOCAL PROGRAMS 37 (June 1997), available at https://www
.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/165360.pdf.
232. Deegan, 605 F.3d at 640 (Bright, J., dissenting).
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child) with Dana’s desire to live a life free of abuse and trauma.
Before the death of her baby, Dana was genuinely afraid that
disclosing the domestic violence would have threatened the
234
existence of her family. Another compounding layer to all of this
is the “extreme poverty and isolation” that Dana experienced, in
235
particular, before the birth of Moses. How could an attorney have
helped with these circumstances?
Perhaps the most fundamental question that this case presents
is what could or should a holistic and feminist approach look like
when women exhibit signs that they will harm their children, or in
236
representing women who have already harmed their children?
These scenarios present the most difficult questions for attorneys
who purport to be holistic and feminists. Some of us, as feminist
attorneys who seek to practice holistically, like to think that we
would be capable of helping a Native woman like Dana. But when
unpacking what this looks like in practice, it becomes clear that this
type of representation is very challenging in both holistic senses—
that is, putting the client in a better overall position and also
practicing in a way that the attorney feels a more humanistic
connection and philosophy in her work. It is challenging to create
a client-centered practice in which Dana’s whole world of problems
would be dealt with. It is also virtually impossible to imagine
engaging in this type of work while remaining balanced and
healthy. However, the right attorney in any given circumstance can
affect both individual and systemic changes.
Attorneys can be catalysts for change. The change can ignite
awareness in both their clients and other stakeholders. An attorney
who takes on the role of representing a Native mother who has
harmed her child, or is at risk of harming her child, would be
helped by being able to see the subtle warning signs that there is
more going on with this mother or family than what appears at first

233. Id. at 639.
234. Id. at 640–41.
235. Id. at 641 (“Ms. Deegan’s state of despair and depression was not merely
the result of the physical, verbal, and sexual abuse she suffered. Ms. Deegan lived
in extreme poverty and isolation.”).
236. Victims of domestic violence benefit from the assistance of attorneys.
See, e.g., Adrienne Jennings Lockie, Salt in the Wounds: Why Attorneys Should Not Be
Mandated Reporters of Child Abuse, 36 N.M. L. REV. 125, 141 (2006).
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237

glance. An attorney, in some cases, is the first and best individual
238
to see indicators of risk of harm.
In many jurisdictions, attorneys are not explicitly included in
statutes as mandatory reporters of child abuse. In such
jurisdictions, they are obligated above all else to keep their clients’
239
lives in their confidence. An attorney may be the only “safe”
person for a woman like Dana. For women like Dana (or her
mother) who may be scared to reveal past abuse and trauma, the
presence of an attorney, well trained in the contextual and
historical traumas his or her client has experienced, may provide
the outlet or support that this client needs to open up. Because of
the lawyer-client relationship, this information would be kept
confidential. This is very different from the relationship that Dana
or her mother would have had with case workers, tribal domestic
240
violence advocates, or even other family members.
This unique role of confidant allows an attorney to build a
trusting relationship with his or her client. However, one challenge
that comes along with working with Native women who have
experienced trauma, abuse, or have mental health concerns, is that
once a client reveals information about his or her situation, in
many cases, the client does not want this information shared or
used in his or her case. An attorney must talk through the concerns
and benefits of sharing personal information about abuse or
trauma with other stakeholders or the finder of fact. In the case of
Native women, there is additional stigma attached to sharing this
information. Above all else, attorneys should give Native women
clients who have experienced trauma and abuse the dignity of
having control over how their story and information is shared.

237. See generally Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers
Should Be Good Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437 (2008) (discussing insights for interviewing and
counseling clients).
238. See Evan R. Seamone, Attorneys as First-Responders: Recognizing the Destructive
Nature of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder on the Combat Veteran’s Legal Decision-Making
Process, 202 MIL. L. REV. 144, 146–47 (2009).
239. Mandatory reporting laws often conflict with attorney professional
responsibility rules (namely maintaining the confidentiality of clients). Lockie,
supra note 236, at 129.
240. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2−3 (2012), available at https://www.childwelfare.gov
/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/manda.pdf.
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Some Native clients do decide to have this personal
information shared or it is a part of the reason why the case exists.
In child protection cases, cases involving orders for protection, and
in criminal cases, information about past trauma, abuse, drug use,
and mental health concerns are often a part of the case from the
beginning. Attorneys in these situations must work through with
clients how to frame these complex issues in a way that does not
241
harm their clients or the clients’ families. This may mean delving
further into the situation, to unearth more facts and details about
trauma or abuse that might help an outsider better understand the
client’s position and behavior, or how historical trauma in this
particular community has impacted his or her choices.
By understanding the intersection of oppressions that Native
mothers experience, an attorney will be better situated to address
the systematic discrimination that exists because of this
complicated duality. Native mothers have ended up where they are
(as clients in a divorce, orders for protection, housing court, or as
criminal defendants) because of their experiences in the world
being Native, victims, women, and mothers. When attorneys can
articulate this reality to fact finders, stakeholders, and system
decision makers, their clients have the best chance of being truly
understood and, therefore, of being treated fairly.
V. CONCLUSION
While we offer suggestions as to what strategies our feminist
approach would look like or would have looked like in Dana’s life,
we also want to recognize at the end that perhaps the most
important feminist legal response to a situation like Dana’s is to
continue to advocate and work for her legal rights after the death
of Moses. If Dana thought she was isolated before the birth of
Moses, and felt alone and afraid and overwhelmed, those feelings
have magnified since her charges, trial, conviction, and prison
242
sentence. Dana, like many mothers in prison, has been written off
241. For example, one study suggests that most women who are hospitalized
for mental illness after birth lose full custody of their children at some point. Jill
G. Joseph et al., Characteristics and Perceived Needs of Mothers with Serious Mental
Illness, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1357, 1358 (1999). Deciding whether or not to
seek psychiatric care, then, has legal implications for which holistic services could
be very helpful.
242. Dana entered the federal prison system in 2008. She was initially
incarcerated in California and was unable to visit with her three daughters for over

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

45

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 4

988

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:3

and forgotten by most of us. For many feminist lawyers, Dana
represented a compelling client before the death of Moses. She
represented the ultimate intersectional example of exploitation.
She was a victim. She was poor. She was Native. She was a mother.
However, as soon as she was convicted of causing the death of her
child, she became a pariah to some in the community that should
still be supporting her the mostfeminist lawyers. When in reality
what had happened was that another layer in the intersection of
243
Dana’s life had emerged. Now, she was also a convicted felon.
It is our belief that attorneys equipped with a holistic and
intersectional feminist method can be catalysts for change for
Native mothers and their children. Attorneys using this approach
can effect change in the lives of their clients and—we hope—within
systems that have historically oppressed and unfairly treated these
clients. We hope that this practice, if implemented, can effect
change within both the child protection and criminal justice
systems. Our focus on the history of Native women reminds us how
oppressed they have historically been, and how this oppression
affects individuals’ lives. Dana’s story provides a unique lens to
examine our approach. She is a Native mother who experienced
individual and historical trauma without effective interventionand this trauma had horrific results in her life.
Our particular feminist approach may provide the best chance
there is to protect Native women and their children in dire
circumstances. Attorneys advocate to judges and county
prosecutors, caseworkers, guardians, and all of these stakeholders
who ultimately make decisions about the fate of Native women and
their children. If they can be made aware of the implications of
individual and historical trauma in a meaningful way, interventions
and outcomes may begin to change. We also believe that in some
two years. By all accounts, Dana is a wonderful, caring mother to her three
daughters despite being incarcerated. Her daughters trust her and seek her advice
as they transition into adulthood.
243. A lawyer representing Dana after her conviction and prison sentence will
have to be attuned to the needs of women in prison, and more importantly, to the
unique client needs upon release. See generally STEPHANIE S. COVINGTON,
A WOMAN’S JOURNEY HOME: CHALLENGES FOR FEMALE OFFENDERS AND THEIR
CHILDREN 15 (2002), available at http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/prison2home02
/Covington.pdf (describing the effects of prison on women’s mental health and
family structure and examining the unique situation that exists for mothers in
prison, and the potential impact that this separation from children can have on
the women).
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cases the right kind of feminist legal intervention, and the
confidentiality it provides, can prevent future harm. This too gives
us hope for mothers like Dana.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

47

